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·s. 367A: "SPRUNG ALIBIS" SEIZED ,FROM DEFENCE v-TEAPONRY 
PART I: THE UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF THE "SPRUNG ALIBI" 
1. The Banham Murder Trial 
An alibi 
1 can be one of the most simple, yet effective, means of 
destroying a prosecution case. It will usually terminate proceedings. 
at an early stage as in the case of an alibi tendered at the time 
of arrest. Prior to 1973 however, it often would not appear until 
the Court proceedings, where it would be "sprung" on the 
prosecution without warning and often with drastic effects upon 
their case. 
On the morning of 21st February 1963 the body of a murdered Nelson 
taxi-driver was discovered on the roadside near Hope, a township a 
f ew miles out of Nelson. On 4th February 1964, the trial began 
in the Wellington Supreme Court of Maurice Albert Davis, charged 
with the murder of Peter Carthew Banham: R v. 
. 2 . 
Davis or as it 
c a me to be known, "The Banh am Murder Trial". Between the date of 
the murder and the date of trial was conducted one of the most 
comprehensive enquiries by the New Zealand Police. Enquiries and 
interviews were made throughout New Zealand and at the early stages 
of investigation there were no fewer than fourteen members of the 
C.I.B. engaged full-time. Detectives were often working seven 
days a week, fourteen hours a day, conducting the 5,000 interviews 
that were estimated to have been made in the Nelson district alone
3 . 
1 " 'Alibi' is a Latin adverb meaning 'elsewhere or at another 
place' and if evidence for an accused that he was not present 
at a place at the time an offence was there committed is 
accepted by a jury, he is said to have established an alibi" 
R v. Foll (1957) 21 W.W.R. 481, per Montague, J. A ., at p.491. 
2 ~96~ N.Z.L.R. 417: this reported part of the case deals only 
with an application before the Supre~e Court for a change of venue. 
3 Detective Inspector Knapp's esti~ation in response to a 
question posed by the defence in the Magistrate's Court hearing 
in Nelson. Vict.::,ri, of 
Law Li rar 
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In terms of money involved, man hours expended, and resources 
employed, the conviction of Davis that followed about a year later 
was to mark a triumµifor the New Zealand investigatory process 4 
"This investigation will go on record as one of the 
outstanding cases in police history. The crime proved 
to be most difficult and complex and it represents an 
outstanding example of tenacious and intensive investigation 
by the police, who worked as a team with the valuable aid 
of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
pathologists, business firtns, the press, and last but not 
least, the people of Nelson." 5 
Yet this triumfhmight well have been bitter ·disappointment. In 
what was described as "a sensational development in the trial", 6 
the accused made at the eleventh hour 7 an unbelievable unsworn 
statement from the dock 8 He said: 
"I cannot tell you who killed Peter Banham any more than 
the Police can but I do know something - what is more 
the Police know it too - and that is this: there is a 
man McDonald in Sydney who has been convicted of murder, 
who has killed four p e ople all involving attacking a 
victim with a k nife , who a t hi s trial his d e fence was 
that he was insane at the time he did it. The jury 
rejected his defence and found him guilty of murder. In 
August last this man confessed to killing Peter Banham at 
Nelson and the Police know it. The Police also know that 
he was in Ne w Ze al a nd a nd in the Wellington area at the 
time of Peter Banham's de ath and they cannot show that he 
was not in Nelson at the time that he says he was. I have 
been advised that his evidence cannot be brought at this 
trial. I ask you to remember these things when you 
consider my position. I repeat I did not injure nor did 
I kill or have anything to do with Peter Banham's death. 
4 For an account of the exhaustive and often frustrating enquiries 
undertaken by the police, and coverage of the lengthy and 
involved trial that followed in Wellington, see Pursuit of 
Justice: A Triumph of New Zealand Detection by J.D. McGilvary, 
a reporter covering the case. 
5 .The then Commissioner of Police, Mr C.L. Spencer, quoted by 
McGilvary at page 13. 
6 
7 
8 
Pursuit of Justice, ante, at p.183. 
Late in the afternoon of 11th February 1964, the day before he 
was subsequently convicted and sentenced. 
In the notes of evidence Barrowclough C.J. stressed his reluctance 
to have this statement placed on record, but did so only on 
the request of counsel. 
In R. v. Sherri£ (1903) 20 Cox 334, Darling J. held that a 
defendant's unsworn statement must be made before the counsel for 
the prosecution sums up the case and before his own counsel 
addresses the Court. If this we re the correct approach, 
Barrowclough C.J. ought not to have permitted the statement to 
be made at all. 
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I am completely innocent of this charge. 119 
were the implications inherent in this unsworn statement to be 
carried to their ultimate logical extension
10 , it would seem that 
a reasonable doubt would be aroused in the minds of jurymen. The 
criminal law demands proof beyond any reasonable doubt of murder. 
An acquittal of the accused at this late stage of the case would 
have been totally unacceptable - not merely for those whose close 
attention had been focused on the case for nearly a year, but 
moreover totally unacceptable from such wider points of view as 
the waste of taxpayers' money. 
At 9 a.m. on the day following the making of the unsworn statement 
the prosecution were able to adduce evidence from six witnesses 
which effectively rebutted any implications raised by the accused's 
11 unsworn statement. The Police in this case were fortunat~ in 
that they had previously made investigations about this man McDonald 
as claimed by Davis, and were thus able to produce six witnesses 
at such short notice. 1
2 They had in fact submitted their findings 
about McDonald to the accused's counsel prior to the trial. 
9 The unsworn statement also contained references to the 
accused's injured hand. The full statement and its effect 
upon the Court proceedings iS reproduced in Pursuit of 
Justice, ante, Chapter 25. 
10 i.e. were the Police in fact aware that someone else had 
committed the murder, but were of malice aforethought 
proceeding against a man whom they knew to be innocent. 
11 It was shown that McDonald had been at work in ~vellington both 
on 20th February 1963 and the day after; that there 
was no means whereby he could have travelled to and from Nelson 
between those two days. 
12 Ironically it was the change of venue for the trial from Nelson 
to Wellington that also helped the prosecution in this regard. 
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Although not strictly speaking an alibi, the unsworn statement 
made by Davis exposed acutely the undesirable nature not only 
of the unsworn statement itself, but also of the "sprung alibi''. 
Normally the only possiblity open to a prosecutor caught unprepared 
by either of these being offered at trial was to seek an adjournment. 
But with a jury fully empanelled a judge could not neglect the 
personal inconvenience to jurymen by extending what might already 
be a lengthy trial. It is suggested that both the unsworn statement 
and the "sprung" alibi served no other purpose than to introduce 
needless elements of uncertainty into the criminal trial. 
2. Reform Proposed in U.K. 
Concurrent with the investigations being made into the Banham 
murder case, the English Criminal Law Revision Coromittee were 
13 
making a close examination of the law relating to alibis. The 
Committee were clearly on the· opinion that there was "aa strong 
case for amending the law so as to deprive accused persons of 
the privilege of keeping back a defence of alibi until the last 
mornent 11 • 14 Accordingly their principal recommendation as regards 
alibis was that: 15 
Q 
"at ~ Atrial on indictment the accused should not without 
the leave of the Court be able to adduce evidence in 
support of an alibi unless he gives particulars of the 
alibi during or at the end of the committal proceedings 
or else by written notice to the solicitor for the 
prosecutor not later than seven days after the end of 
the proceedings." 
The _Conm1ittee' s proposed amendment was subsequently incorporated 
into English Law as s.11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (U.K.). 
13 Criminal Law Revision Conunittee, Ninth Report (Cmnd. 3145) 
para's 31~44. The Re port was presented to Parliament in 
November 1966. 
14 Ibid., at para. 34. 
15 Ibid, at para. 36. 
___ ,, ~•~n ~ --r----------------------, 
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Defences of the old conunon law rule
16 put forward to the Criminal 
Law Revision Conunittee were four-fold:-
(i) It was argued that there was no substantial need for change -
t hat the occurrence of alibis in the criminal Courts was insufficient 
t o warrant such an extensive change in the laws.
17 
I t would as a matter of common sense seem that an alibi checked 
by the prosecution and found to be true would effectively bring an 
e nd to criminal proceedings. This avoids unnecessary expense and 
moreover consumption of valuable Court time. Only in those cases 
where the r e is a dispute by the prosecution as to the validity o f 
a n alibi tendered ought the issue ever appear in Court and in that 
context as a substantive issue with relevant submissions prepared 
by both parties. It is therefore suggested that the mandatory 
giving of prio r no tice of a n alibi would further the above proce s s 
and indirectly l e ad to a further diminution of th e appearance of 
a libis in our Courtrooms. 
With respe ct, I am unable to see that rarity of appearance is a 
valid defence of the "sprung alibi". If such an argument was 
o f un~versal validity against change in the criminal law, then 
re formers would find themselves in a difficult position and the 
16 That an accused need not disclose his alibi prior to the trial. 
17 This argument was revived in New Zealand by the Hon. F.D. 
O'Flynn, Q.C., who went so far as to say that in all his 
years defending criminal prosecutions he had never used 
an alibi in its strictest sense as a mean of defending his 
client: (1973) 38 4 N.Z.P.D. 2573. 
• 
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a lready slow process of law reform would virtually grind to a halt. 
"If we are to accept that a mischief is to be remedied only when 
t he mischief occurs, the implications for our s y stem of law should 
be obvious." 
18 
"Sprung a libis" existed as an unsatisfactory 19 
e lement of our criminal law and while not having appeared very 
often, need never have appeared at all. 
(ii) In any event, it was stressed, the prosecution and the judge 
c an comment on the failure of the accused to mention an alibi 
earlier. 
The judge could invite the jury, in con s idering the weight which 
t hey should give to evide nce of an alibi, to take into consideration 
t he fact that the accus e d, by not mentioning it beforehandr has 
deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to investigate it. 
20 
But it had to b e ma de c l e ar t o t h e jury that t he ac cused has the 
r ight not to me ntion his d e f e nce b e fore hand, and t he summing up 
could not suggest tha t the f a ilure to mention the alibi is itse lf 
. d . h d 21 e vi ence against t e accuse . 
"The non-disclosure of an alibi has always b e en open to 
comment (R. v. Little boy ) and this should be a 
sufficient sanction a lthough it does not a ppear to 
have been followe d wi de ly in practice. The Society 
conside rs on balance that th e law should be left as it 
is. II 22 
18 Ibid., at p.2574. 
19 See [1968] 31 M.L.R. a t 22. 
20 R. v. Little boy [1934) 2 K.B. 408; 24 Cr. App. R. 192. 
21 R. v. Ry an (1964) 50 Cr. App. R. 144; R. v. Hoare 
50 Cr. App. R. 166. 
(1966) 
22 From submissions b y the New Ze aland Law Soci e ty on clauses 
10 and 11 of the Cr i me s Ame ndment Bi ll 1973. 
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Ye t no amount of adverse comment in some situations will be as 
de structive as conclusive evidence in rebuttal. It is the 
"reasonable doubt" raised in the minds of jurymen that must be 
extinguished. Facts, it is suggested, are more likely to achieve 
t his than adverse conunent. 23 
(j: ii )_ It was argued that there is nothing so special about alibi 
defences as to justify making an exception, in respect of them, 
t o the general rule that the defence are not obliged to disclose 
t heir case to the prosecution. 
This arglilllent presupposes that the general rule ! from which it 
derives, is in all respects a sound one. A distinction can be drawn 
be tween a defence argument based on a point of law and one based 
on an alibi. In the former instance strict adherence to the 
characte ristics of the adve r s ary s ys t em will b e st insure a valid 
precedent is established; but in the latter case, the defence 
claim is based on a question of fact relevant only to the two 
parti e s to the action - the validity of the alibi might best be 
de termined by informal co-operation by the parties prior to the 
t rial. 
(jvl It was also contended that the accused, especially if he 
i s in custody, may have difficulty in finding a witness to a good 
alibi in time to comply with the requirement of giving notice 
and that in any event there are practical difficulties about the 
police interviewing alibi witnesses. 
23 One is again r e minded of the pathetic figure of Davis 
spe aking from the dock. 
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Any practical difficulties the police might suffer in investigating 
cf 
an alibi they have been given prior notice~might well have been 
practical impossibilities if not sprung on the prosecution until 
the time of trial. 
3. Reform Proposed in New Zealand 
A section analagous to s.11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 
(U.K.) did not become law in New Zealand until 1973. 
24 The 
Bill containing the amendr!lent was referred to the Statutes Revision 
Cormnittee to whom particular concern was expressed by the New Zealand 
Law Society to the effect that: 
"if this provision is adopted and the prosecution acts on 
the notice given to investigate the particulars given, the 
prosecution should be required either to make available to 
the defence copies of all statements obtained by them 
when investigating the alibi, excluding statements not 
directly relevant to it, and also the names of witnesses 
interviewed by the police from whom statements have not 
been taken, or to give notice to the defence of when the 
Police will be interviewing the alibi witnesses, with 
defence counsel having the right to be present at such 
interview. The Society understands that an undertaking 
has been given by the Home Office in England 25 that the 
Crown will qive such notice in cases where alibis are 
involved." 26 
At the time of writing, General Instructions to the Police, pursuant 
to s.30 of the Police Act 1958, are being drafted. A final copy 
of these instructions was not available, but their substance will 
likely include these provisions: 
"1. (a) Alibi witnesses whose particulars have been advised 
in accordance with section 367A are not to be interviewed 
by the Police except at the request of the Crown Prosecutor. 
24 s.11 of the Crimes Amendment Act 1973 inserted a new s.367A 
into the Crimes Act 1961. 
25 This was the recommendation made by the Criminal Law 
Committee when similar concern was expressed to it: 
3145, para. 40. But see ll97~ Crim. L.R. at p.l. 
Revision 
Cmnd. 
26 Quoted by the Minister of Justice: (1973) 384 N. Z ,P.D. 2371. 
-~ 
( 
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(b) Whether or not the Crown Prosecutor has requested 
that alibi witnesses be interviewed, inquiries shall not be 
made of persons other than those whose particulars have 
been supplied to confirm or rebut evidence in support of 
an alibi. The result of these inquiries is to be forwarded 
to the Crown Prosecutor. 
2. When the Crown Prosecutor requests that alibi witnesses 
whose particulars have been supplied be interviewed, the 
following procedure is to be adopted: 
(a) The defence solicitor should be told of the proposed 
interview and given a reasonable opportunity to be present. 
(b) When an accused is not represented an endeavour should 
be made to ensure the witness is interviewed in the presence 
of some independent person not being a me~~er of the Police. 
(c) When the defence solicitor is not pres.ent at the 
interview and so requests, a copy of a witness's signed 
statement take n a t a ny such inte rview is to be ma de a vailable 
to him through the Crown Prosecutor. 
3. Particulars of and statements from witnesses interviewed 
for the purpose of r e butting evidence of an alibi witness should 
only be made available to the de fence at the r equest of the 
Crown Prosecutor." 26a 
Whe n s pe ak ing t o the 2nd Re a d i n g of the Amendment Bi l l, the Mi nis t e r 
27 
of Justice stated uncate gorically that: 
"the inte nt of the s e ction is to ensure tha t the prose cution 
is not take n by surprise by an alibi which it may not be 
able to investigate and, if appropriate, r ebut, and the 
change is the r e fore designed to avoid as far as possible 
the introduction of false alibis into crimina l trials in 
the Supreme Court." 
This intention was stated more simply by the Criminal Law Revision 
C 
. 28 
ornrnittee: 
2.~ 
27 
"We believe that it will contribute substantially to the 
breaking down of false alibis if notice of an alibi has 
to be given in advance." 
frc,, t tk~ ' r c\ ii\€ I~ l1(hcl'\'S ·~Ltbll'\1tl,1l ~J -lh.? R \1(.( l<jcl Sl'ct,,n 
Ibid, at p.2570 
2 8 Cmnd. 3145, p a ra . 35. 
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The legislative intent behind s~367A ot the Crimes Act can thus 
be stated to be; 
(a) to effectively toll the death bells of the sprung alibi; 
(b) to restrict the occurrence of false alibis by enabling 
the police to investigate tfie alibi before evidence of it 
is given. 
PART II; THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
1. An end to "the Unsworn Statement 
s.266A of the Crimes Act 1~61 
29 states that: 
V(ll No accused person shall be entitled to make an unsworn 
statement of fact at his trial . 
~) Nothing in this section shall limit the provisions of 
s. 369 of this Act. 11 
This ame ndment ende d a lon g --::, t a.ndi ng anomaly in our criminal trial, 
t he unacceptable effects of which were demonstrated by~- v. Davis. 
"This archaic rule originate s from the time when the 
accused himself could not give evidence in his own 
defence. It was not until towards the end of last 
centuDy that the accused was given that right. For 
a long time he had the right to make an unsworn statement 
because he could not give evidence himself. When the 
law was changed to allow him to give evidence, 30 this 
provision should have been abolished." 31 
While placing handicaps on the prosecution, the unsworn statement 
nevertheless attracted many advantages of formal evidence. 
29 As inserted by s.5(1) of the Crimes Amendment Act 1966. 
See also s.3 of the Summary Proceedings Amendment Act 1973. 
30 By s.2 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1889. 
31 Hon. J.R. Hanan (Minister of Justice) introducing the 
1966 Amendment into Pa rliament. (1966) 346 N.Z.P.D., 
pp. 490-491. 
f 
(~ 
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"Where a defendant makes an unsworn statement from the 
dock, the judge need not read out the statement to the 
jury, but he should remind them of it and tell them that 
though it is not sworn evidence which can be the subject 
of cross-examination, nevertheless they can attach to 
it such weight as they think fit and should take it into 
consideration in deciding whether the prosecution have 
proved their case." 32 
One advantage for the prosecution was that the unsworn statement 
33 
could not be the subject of cross-examination; but it would 
s eem that unless prepared for the unsworn statement, a right to 
c ross-examine would be of little value to the prosecution in any 
case. 
Another advantage to the accused of the unsworn statement was that 
i t did not give rise to a right of reply by the prosecution and 
possibly the all-important "last word" to the jury . 
34 
2 . No Right of Re ply in a ny Cas e 
s .367(3) 
35 now states that: 
"After the closing address (if any) on behalf of the prosecution 
the accused or his counsel may make a closing address to 
the jury and the prosecution shall have no right of reply 
in any case." 
32 R. v. Frost and Hale (1964) Cr. App. R. 28~, per Parker L.C.J. 
at 291; and see R. v. Perry and Pledge£ Ll920] N.Z.L.R. 21. 
33 The validity of the unsworn statement could be tested if the 
prosecution could put prior convictions in cross-examination. 
By abolishing the unsworn statement and at the same time allowing 
the Judge to conrrnent on the accused's failure to give evidence 
places the accused in a dilemma - see Adams, Criminal Law and 
Practice in New Zealand, (2nd Ed.), para. 2957. 
34 By s.367(3) and (4) of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 
1966 Amendment. 
35 As substituted by s.6 of Crimes Amendment Act 1966. 
Thus: 
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"the prosecution in a criminal trial may sum up to the 
jury, but having done so the defence has the right to the 
last say before the jury in every case; that is whether 
evidence is or is not called for the defence, or whether 
the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General appears, 
which are normally exceptions to the rule. It does not 
matter what the circumstances are, the defending counsel 
or the accused shall have the last say before the jury." 36 
The final address to the jury prior to summing up is clearly a 
crucial one and it is only consistent with the notion that an 
accused is innocent until proven guilty that this right should go 
to the accused in every case. 
3. Notice of Alibi Required 
s.367A of the Crimes Act 37 enacts that: 
"(1) On the trial of any accused person who has been committed 
for trial, he shall not without the leave of the Court 
adduce evidence in support of an alibi unless, before the 
expiry of 14 days after the date on which he is so 
committed he has given notice of particulars of the alibi. 
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, the 
accused shall not without the leave of the Court call any 
other person to give evidence in support of an alibi 
unless -
(a) The notice under that subsection includes the name 
and address of the witness or, if the name or address 
is not known to the accused when he gives the notice, 
any information in his possession that might be of 
material assistance in finding the witness: 
(b) If the name or the address is not included in the 
notice, the Court is satisfied that before giving the 
notice the accused took all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the name or address would be ascertained, 
and that after giving the notice he continued to take 
all such steps: 
(c) If the name or the address is not included in the 
notice, but the accused subsequently discovers the 
name or address or receives other information that 
might be of material assistance in finding the 
witness he forthwith gives notice of the name, address, 
or other infonnation, as the case may require: 
36 (1966) 381 N.Z.P.D. 491. 
37 As inserted by s.11 of the Crimes Amendment Act 1973, The 
section is virtually a replica of s.11 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967 (U.K.). 
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(d) If the accused is notified by or on behalf of the 
prosecutor that the witness has not been traced by 
the name or at the address given, he forthwith gives 
notice of any such information which is in his 
possession or, on subsequently receiving any such 
information, forthwith gives notice of it. 
(3) The Court shall not refuse leave under this section if it 
appears to the Court that the accused was not given notice, 
in accordance with section 168A of the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957, of the requirements of this section. 
(4) Any evidence tendered to disprovef an alibi may, subject 
to any directions by the Court as to the time when it is 
to be given, be given before or after evidence is given in 
support of the alibi. 
(5 ) Any notice purporting to be given under this section on 
behalf of the accused by his counsel or solicitor shall 
unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be given with 
the authority of the accused. 
(6 ) A notice under subsection (1) of this section shall either 
be given in Court during or at the end of the preliminary 
hearing before the Magistrate's Court or be given in writing 
to the prosecutor; a nd a notice under paragraph (c) or 
paragraph (d) of subsection (2) of this section shall be 
given in writing to the prosecutor. 
(7) A notice to the prosecutor under this section shall be given -
(a) In the case of a prosecution on behalf of the Crown, 
by delivering it to a Crown solicitor, or by leaving 
it at his office, or by sending it by registered letter 
addressed to him at his office: 
(b) In the case of a private prosecutor represented by 
counsel, by delivering it to such counsel, or by 
leaving it at his office, or by sending it by registered 
letter addressed to him at his office: 
(c) In the case of a private prosecutor not represented 
by counsel, by delivering it to him, or by leaving it 
for him at his place of residence with a member 
of his family living with him and appearing to be 
of or over the age of 18 years, or by sending it by 
registered letter addressed to him at his last known 
or usual place of residence or at his place of business. 
(8) In this section, the expression 'evidence in support of an 
alibi' means evidence tending to show that by reason of the 
presence of the accused at a particular place or in a 
particular area at a particular time he was not, or was 
unlikely to have been, at the place where the offence is 
alleged to have been committed at the time of its alleged 
commission." 
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The section does not attempt to lay down what particulars of the 
proposed alibi have to be given. 
"What will be sufficient particulars of the alibi will 
depend on the circumstances, but they will in any event 
include particulars of the place where the accused intends 
to prove that he was and the time. Owing to the 
definition of ~evidence in support of an alibi' in 
cause 3(7) 38 the accused will have to give notice of 
an alibi which consists of saying that he was at a place 
not at the time of the offence but at a time which makes 
it impossible or difficult for him to have been at the 
place of the offence when it was committed." 39 
"Evidence in support of an alioi" as defined will also include the 
case where the accused himself gives evidence as the only witness 
to the alibi: 
. 40 
R. v. Jackson and Robertson. Jackson was 
accused of robbery. At the end of the prosecution case it emerged 
tha t Jackson would be called to give evidence on his own behalf 
tha t at the time the robbery took place he was elsewhere. The 
prosecution objected on tho ground that notice had not been served 
within the prescribed period. The defence counsel contended that 
no such notice was necessary as the defence had no intention to 
call witnesses other than the accused himself to testify as to his 
whereabouts at the material time; that "evidence in support of an 
al ibi" refers only to witnesses other than to the defendant himself. 
If this argument were acceptable, it would clearly have grave 
implications on the effectiveness of s.367A. CusackJ. had little 
difficulty in dismissing it; 
38 ..I. . e., in subs. (8) of the N.Z. ~ ~e d -1 n 
39 Cmnd. 3145, paragraph 36. 
40 [1973] Crim. L.R. 356 
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"It seems to me that there is a clear distinction between 
subsection 1 and subsection 2. Subsection 1 deals with 
evidence tending to show that the defendant was elsewhere 
at a particular time. That, in my opinion, includes 
evidence which he himself may give. Subsection 2 deals 
with evidence given by other personsof whom the statutory 
details are necessary. I therefore find that subsection 
1 applies when it is sought by a defendant, albeit he 
calls no witnesses in support, to prove that he was elsewhere 
at the material time. It follows that notice of alibi 
should have been given in this case." 41 
The period for giving notice was extended from the seven days of 
the English statute to one of fourteen days in s.367A(l) of our 
Ac t at the instance o .f the New Zealand Law Society. "The time 
o f seven days allowed for giving notice is not adequate and should 
be extended to at least fourteen days. A time limit of one week 
th rows an unduly heavy burden on the defence which will be particularly 
42 
serious in the case of l egally aided defendants." 
At the committal procee d i ngs, the accused must be given written 
notice that if his intended defence is an alibi, he must comply 
43 
with the giving of notice requirement of s.367A. Failure 
t o comply with this forewarning requirement will automatically 
permit the accused to adduce evidence in support of an alibi 
notwithstanding his failure to give prior notice.
44 
41 Ibid., at 357. 
42 From the submissions of the New Zealand Law Society to 
the Statutes Revision Committee on clauses 10 and 11 of 
the Crimes Amendment Bill, 1973. 
43 s.168A of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, as inserted 
by s.12 of the Crimes Amendment Act, 1973. 
44 s.367A(4) of Crimes Act, 1961. 
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The making of provision for giving notice of alibi raises the 
question of the ability of the prosecution to adduce evidence to 
rebut an alibi if the defence in fact put it forward. In general 
all the evidence for the prosecution has to be directed to the 
proof of the charge made in the indictment; it is a matter for 
the discretion of the Court whether to allow the rebutting evidence 
45 or not. 
"Obviously it would be wrong for the prosecution to hold 
back evidence merely in order to put it forward with 
more telling effect after the defence had completed their 
case. On the other hand, when alibi has been put forward, 
even if notice of it has been given, it may be more 
appropriate and convenient that the evidence to destroy it 
should be give n after the case for the defence and in 
rebuttal. For the prosecution may not know for certain 
that the defence will be put forward, and it may be 
confusing for the jury to call evidence to refute something 
which they have not yet heard alleged, especially as this 
may involve issues s eparate from the main issue ... We have 
no doubt that in genera l the Court's powers are and will 
remain sufficie nt to e n a ble them to secure that justice is 
don e in thi s r esp ect. But l es t it should b e a rgued that 
their power to allow ev ide nce to rebut a defence depends on 
the inability of the prosecution to foresee the defence and 
that, notice of the alibi having been given, this condition 
will not be satisfied 46 clause 3(3) 47 provides that the 
giving of a notice shall not prevent the Court from 
receiving evidence in r e butta l of evidence given in support 
of an alibi." 48 
s .367A(4) therefore states that "any evidence tendered to disprove 
a n alibi may, subject to any directions by the Court as to the time 
when it is to be given, be given before or after evidence is given 
i n support of the alibi." 
45 
; • , 
R. v. Owen Ll952j 2 Q.B. 362; ~- v. Flynn (1957) 42 Cr. App. R.15. 
46 An apparent suggestion made by Lord Goddard C.J. in R. v. Flynn 
(1957) Cr. App. R. 15 a pp. 18-19. 
47 s.367A(4) Crimes Act, 1961. 
48 Cmnd. 3145, paragra p h 41. 
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Where infonnation given in accordance with s.367A(.2) is alleged 
by the Crown to be spurious or useless, they should call evidence 
t o that effect . This would not only give the defence the opportunity 
of cross-examining the witnesses brought forward by the Crown, but 
would also give them the opportunity of calling evidence of their 
49 
own to refute any allega tions being made by the Crown. 
PART III: s.367A IN PRACTICE 
1. Discretion to Admit 
It is to be hoped that the discretion to admit alibi evidence 
notwithstanding non~compliance with tfie requirement to give notice 
wi ll be liberally exercised to ensure that the interests of an 
accused are not unduly prejudice d in certain circumstances. 
One such circumsta nce, it i s sugges ted, would b e a n exce ssive 
de lay in obtaining lega l aid: R. v. Sullivan. SO 
On April 10, 1969, the accused was committ e d for trial on a charge 
of dangerous driving, the trial date being fixed as June 11. The 
accused did not obtain legal aid until June 1, when his solicitor 
wrote to the prosecution informing them that the defence was an 
alibi, but the particulars of the alibi witnesses were not given 
until June 11, the date of the trial. When the case was called 
fo r trial on June 11, the Crown asked for an adjournment until 
J uly, for the purpose of investigating the alibi, and were granted 
s uch an adjournment. At the trial the Crown objected to the alibi 
49 R. v. Sullivan [1971] 1 Q.E. 253, per Salmon L.J. at 259. 
50 Ibid. 
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evidence being introduced on the ground that s.11(1) had not been 
complied with. 
This objection was accepted by the trial judge and the accused 
was subsequently convicted. 
51 On appeal, the Court of Appeal were of the opinion that the 
exercise of discretion against admission had been wrong, and that 
the evidence ought to have been admitted. 52 
"In the view of this Court the period of seven days was 
inserted in the Act because normally (although, of course, 
by no means always) a trial comes on within a reasonably 
short time after the termination of committal proceedings. 
Therefore, if the prosecution obtain the information within 
the seven days, it gives them time in which to investigate 
the information. The legislature, however, fully realized 
that there may be circwnstances when it would not be 
possible to give the information or when there may be some 
reason why the information is not given within the seven 
days, but, nevertheless , justice demands that the alibi 
evidence shall be he~ra at the trial. 
The Court has a discretion to allow alibi witnesses to be 
called in such circumstances. ·fhat discretion must be 
exercised judicially." 53 
In this instance all the relevant information was in the hands of 
the prosecution at the date of trial. "If it was given late, then 
the delay was waived by the Crown wh en they asked for an adjournment 
until July, so that they might investigate the information." 54 
Although this reasoning would appear to be the basis of the decision, 
it is submitted that more emphasis ought to have been placed by the 
51 Salmon and Phillimore L.JJ., Nield J. 
52 Conviction quashed. It seems that had the prosecution simply 
allowed the alibi evidence to be adduced, then called evidence 
in rebuttal, the result may have been different: see the 
observations to that effect of Salmon L.J. at 259-260. 
53 Ibid, at p.258. per Salmon L.J. 
54 Ibid, at pp. 258-9. 
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court on the delay in obtaining legal aid as being one such 
ci rcumstance where "justice demands that tfie alibi evidence shall 
be heard at the trial., " It was that delay which would seem to 
55 haye been the cause of the non-compliance with s.11(1). 
2. vEvidence· in Support of an Alibi~ 
If the whereaoouts ot tfie accused at an alternative time to that 
s tated on the depositions is called into question at trial, should 
an alibi in that circumstance be subject to the restrictions of 
s • 3 6 7 A (_l ) ? 
56 Roy ). 
The a.nswer would appear to be no: R . v. Lewis (Albert 
The accused was charged with receiving stolen postal orders. At 
the committal proceedings tfie case for the prosecution was directed 
to showing that the de f e ndant had received physical possession of 
the property on l'le dne s d ay, Fe bruary 14 ~ Howeve r, at the trial a n 
is sue arose as to whether or not the accused was driving a car 
used in connection with part of the stolen property on the following 
57 Friday. The accused wished to tender alibi evidence relating 
to his whereabouts on the Friday, but the trial judge ruled that 
this was not permissible since the requirements of s.11(_1) had not 
be en met. 
On appeal it was concede d by the Crown that this ruling was wrong. 
58 I n affirming this, Widgery L.J. laid down two propositions; 
55 The reason for the delay in obtaining legal aid is not discussed 
in the j udgmen t. 
5 6 (1 9 6 9] 2 Q • B . 1 ( C . A • ) . 
57 Had he been the drive r, that would have jus tified an 
alternative receiving charge under s.4(7) of the Criminal 
Law Act 1967(U.K.). 
58 Ibid, at p.6. 
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" first, that the only evidence in support of an alibi 
to which section [367]il applies is evidence relative to the 
whereabouts of the defendant at the time when the crime 
is alleged to have been committed. Evidence relative to 
his whereabouts on another occasion is not subject to the 
restrictions of the section, however significant that 
evidence may be to the issues of the case. Thus if the 
defendant is charged with a robbery which is alleged to 
have been committed on a Monday, and part of the evidence 
against him is that he was seen on the Tuesday driving 
a van which contained the stolen goods, he may tender 
evidence of alibi relating to the Tuesday without giving 
notice under the section. 
Secondly, the defendant is required to give notice of alibi 
under the section within seven days of the end of the 
proceedings before the examining justices, and if a question 
arises as to the place or date at or on which the offence 
is alleged to have been committed for the purpose of 
{§.367A(8LJ, this question must be resolved on the material then 
available to the defendant, namely the committal charges 
and the depositions. At the trial the prosecution may 
seek to put the case in a different way or upon different 
charges, but this cannot create any new duty on the defendant 
to give notice of an alibi." 
These are propositions based on fairness and common sense, yet the 
likelihood still exists that an accused will take advantage of this 
anomaly and tender a false alibi, despite the intention of the 
legislature that the section shoulrl eradicate the incidence of 
false alibis. It is submitted that the satisfactory solution would 
be for the judge to exercise his discretion and grant an appropriate 
. -i 59 ad journment where requirec. 
3. Comment on Failure to Mention Alibi at time of Arrest 
Prior to the 1973 Crimes Amendment, where an accused failed to 
mention an alibi before his trial, it was clearly within the bounds 
60 
of propriety for the judge to comment adversely on that failure. 
Although much of this area of comment is now largely historical, 
the question is focused on whether or not a judge ought to comment 
59 Cmnd. 3145, para. 37. 
60 R. v. Littleboy, supra, n.20. 
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on the accused's failure to mention an alibi at the time of his· 
arrest, even though he subsequently gave notice in accordance with 
s. 367A. 
This question came before the Court of Appeal in R. v. Lewis. 61 
Lewis had been convicted of the theft of petrol by the Recorder of 
the Bristol Crown Court. Although he refused to say anything w~en 
questioned at the time of his arrest, he later gave notice in due 
form of an intended alibi. In sunrrning up to the jury the Recorder 
had included the following statement; 62 
"It is a matter for you entirely, but you might think that 
if you have a r ea l alibi , the sensible thing to do would 
be at some stage to say to the police: 'Look, go round and 
s e e so-and-so and a s k him where I was last night.' There 
would be no chance for anybody to make up a story, and if 
the police go round a nd find r e spectable people who say: 
'Ye s, h e was here a t this time,' oBviously th a t would be 
the end of the c a s e , there would be no charge , and you would 
not b e h e r e today . But neither of them did that. Neither 
s a i d 'Gp a nd s ee so- and-so, they will t e ll y ou where I 
wa s last nigh t.' They did of course after the Magistrate's 
Court proceedings g i ve notices which the y handed in, because 
until a particular Ac t was passed the defence were entitled 
to spring alibi s by s urprise upon the prosecution and there 
was no chance to check the m, but they h a ve now to give 
notice." 63 
In the e yes of the Court, that comment was capable of one 
interpretation only: 
"Well, members of the jury, you might have thought that 
if this alibi be true, he would have mentioned straight-
away when he was at the police station that he was at the 
place where be subsequently said in his notice of alibi 
that he was at the time." 63 
The Court were clearly of the opinion that such adverse comment 
in this context is inappropriate. If it were justifiable, then 
"notwithstanding ,~hat Pa rli ament has said in [s. 367A (6 )] , tha t a 
61 (1973) 57 Cr. App . R. 860; [1973] Crim. L.R. 576. 
62 Ibid., at p.864. 
63 Ibid., at p.865, p e r Roskill L.J. 
-~ 
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notice of alibi need not be given before the time specified in that 
section, nonetheless a judge might make a comment which amounted 
to a matter of criticism of the defendant that he had not given 
tbe notice of alibi earlier than the time which Parliament has 
l aid down. With the greatest respect to the Recorder, that seems 
t o this Court to be entirely wrong. The comment was one which the 
Re corder ought not to have made." 
64 Also the comment in this 
si tuation was inconsistent with the accused's right to silence 
p ursuant to the caution given to him at the time of his arrest that 
65 
he was under no obligation to say anything. 
Upon review of a long line of authority on the matter, Roskill L.J. 
was undecided as to what comment might be appropriate in these 
circumstances. He conclude d that "If and so l ong as there is a 
doubt what the proper limits a r e thos e concerne d with this problem 
wou ld b e well advis e d to bear i n mind ... that it may b e b e tte r to 
66 
make no comment at all." 
J udges caught in the dile mma of wh e the r they ought to comment in 
th is situation or not may well b e r e scued by sta tute , if reforms o f 
the law relating to criminal e vide nce as suggested by the Criminal 
Law Revision Committe e 67 are adde d to our statute books. Their 
proposal relevant here was that "the l aw s hould be amended so that, 
if the accused has fail e d, when being interrogated by anyone charged 
wi th the duty of investigating officer or charging offenders, to 
mention a fact whi c h h e afte rwards r e lies on at the committal 
64 Ibid. 
65 R. v. Sullivan ·(19 67) 51 er. App. R.102 applied. 
66 Supra, n.61 at p .869 , a dopting a s t a t e men t by Eu~phrey s J. 
in R. v. Tune (1944) 2 9 Cr. Ap p . R. 162, at 165 - "If 
nothing is said by way of comment by the p residing judge, no 
point can be rais e d." 
67 In their Eleventh Re port (Cmn d. 4 991), e spe cially paras. 28-52. 
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proceedings or the trial, the court or jury may draw such inferences 
as appear proper in determining the que stion before them." 
68 
The Committee explicitly stated the i r intention that this reform 
1 t l .b . . . 69 d . . 70 app y o a i i situatl.ons - as occurre in R. v. Lewis. 
As to argument raised a gainst the reform that it would be "unfair", 
the Committee commented that "-this is a matter of opinion and we 
disagree." 
71 
Whether or not the Judge invites them to, the 
j urors must inevitably dr aw their own inferences on the accused 1 s 
fa ilure to mention his alibi at the time of arrest. Situations 
where such inferences are clearly unjustified are hard to imagine. 
In R. v. Lewis 
72 
the jury clearly disbelieved the alibi, yet on 
the basis of nothing more than a technicality of the law relating to 
evi de nce a criminal was "le t off". "It is indeed a strange and 
irrational rule (that) pre cludes the judge from saying what the 
73 
jur y must h ave bee n say ing to thems e lve s." 
Until appropriate l e gislative changes are made, it would seem that 
New Zeala nd judges will b e bound b y the long line of authority 
74 
to the effe ct that a judge is not entitled in any circumstances to 
suggest to a jury when a man refuses to answer any questions after 
68 Ibid., at para. 32. 
69 Ibid., at para 33. 
70 Supra, n.61. 
71 Cmnd. 4991, para . 31. 
72 Supra, n.61. 
73 See (1973] Crim. L.R. 576 , at p. 577. 
74 R. v. Leckey [1944]K.B. 80; R. v. Davis (1959) 4_3 Cr. App. R. 215; ·_ 
R. v. Ryan (1964) er. App. R.144; R. v. IIoare L1966Jl h'.L.R. 
762; R.v. Sullivan (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 102. 
Victori 1 r : .'"'r ify of 
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having been cautioned, that, if he were innocent, it is likely that 
he would have answered the questions. While this rule in no way 
a ssists the innocent, it unduly gives advantage to the guilty. 
Will it take another R. v. Davis situation before reforms are 
e ffected? 
4. Introduction of an alibi notice as part of the prosecution case 
Where there is any inconsistency in a notice of alibi served that 
c an be brought out by e vidence in Court, it will clearly be advantageou: 
t o the prosecution to produce the notice itself as evidence in Court, 
an d allow it to become the subject of adverse comment. Such an 
inconsistency is the failure to call a witness or any of the witnesses 
named in the alibi: R. V. Brigden. 75 
The a c cused had give n a n a lib i notice , but non e o f the persons name d 
in i t was calle d at the tri0 l . At fir s t instance the prose cuti on 
were given leave to put the n o tice in evidence. 76 The trial judge 
commented advers e l y on the a ccused's failure to call the na med 
wi tnesses and the accus e d was sub seque ntly convi cte d. Th e de fendant 
app lie d to the Court o f Ap p e al for leave to appeal on the ground 
that the prosecution should not have been give n leave to include 
the alibi notice as evidence , and that the judge's comment was too 
strong. 
77 The Court of Appeal refused the application stating that there 
nc-·t 
wa s no reason why the prosecution should ~make the alibi notice 
part of their case. 
75 [1973] Crim. L.R. 579 . 
76 Presumably the rule in Frost (1839) 4 St. T. (N.S.) 85 
had been satisfie d. 
77 Roskill L.J. and Stoc k e r J. 
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Wi th respect, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal in this 
cas e went beyond the legislative intent of s.367A, that intent 
be ing to prevent the occurrence of sprung alibis by enabling the 
p ros e cution to be prepared; if the alibi does not appear at the 
t rial, then even though the prosecution may have been prepared for 
i t, it should be the e nd of the matter. There was no intent on 
t he part of the legislature to provide the prosecution in appropriate 
.c ircumstances with a subs tan ti ve part of their evidence. 
are , and it is suggested ought to remain, a defence only. 
Alibis 
The justification for the Court of Appeal's ruling appears to be 
tha t if the accused's failure to call a witness has a perfectly 
innocent explanation, then he will have ample opportunity to 
expla in that innocence wh e n the notice of alibi is add uced as 
evide nc e . However this e xplana tion will invariably involve the 
very r eason why h e d e cide d not to call the witness. There may b e 
many understanda ble , though perhaps not justifiable reasons, why 
78 an accus e d may not decide to call an alibi witness . 
For e x ample, A and B travel to Palmerston North in B's car one 
week e nd. On Monday morning stolen goods are found in A's car. 
A gives notice of anmibi, naming Bas his witness. Prior to 
trial, however, B tells A he heard A say to his 18 year old son 
on the Friday - "Here, you can use my car this weekend." A, innocent 
o f the charge, may decide not to call Bin fear tha t his evi dence 
78 Similarly whe re the accused ele cts not to call himself 
as a witness: The King v. Mareo0946]N.Z.L.R. 600: 
" ... the reasons for not calling an accused person to 
give evide nce may be legion, and some of the re a sons 
may be ve ry coge nt." pe r Myers C.J. at page 677 . 
f 
(~ 
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in Court may lead to suggestions that his son was involved. Equally 
he will find his attempted explanation for his failure to call Ban 
embarrassment. One lie might lead to another, yet "silly little 
games" that might result will have no connection to A's alleged 
guilt whatsoever. 
It is conceded however that there ought to be exceptions in extreme 
cases to this proposal that alibi notices should not be adduced as 
part of the prosecution case. The exception readily brought to mind 
is notice given of a false alibi or one containing false information. 79 
Here it is submitted that the judge should exercise sparingly his 
gene ral discretion to ensure that the trial is conducted fairly, 
and permit the notice to be adduced as being evidence probative of 
the accused's guilt; let the accused explain the giving notice of 
a false alibi in a formal notice. It would be inconsistent with 
the secondary legislative intent behind s.367A that it contribute 
substantially to the breaking down of the incidence of false alibis if 
an accused were able to serve them with impunity. 
on 
On this question of comment~a discrepancy between the notice and 
the defence put forward or on the omission of the defence to call on 
alibi witness indicated in the notice, the Criminal Law Revision 
Corrunittee felt statutory provisions clearly inappropriate. 80 
"The matter can safely be left to the control of the Courts in the 
exercise of their general power ... to ensure that the trial is 
80 conducted fairly." As already suggested, it is to be hoped that 
this general power will be exercised in favour of the accused so that 
the occurrence of an alibi notice in the prosecution case will be 
79 Another possibility, it is suggested, would be a defence at 
trial inconsistent with the alibi notice. 
80 Cmnd. 3145, para. 42. 
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ve ry rare. This lends support to the view that it is in the 
accused's best interests to serve notice to the prosecution in 
a~cordance with s.367A(2) of all possible witnesses to his alibi. 
By so doing he would not only receive the added benefits of 
extensive police facilities for enquiry (if he is innocent of the 
charge), but he would so do without fear of adverse cormnent from 
the judge if he subsequently decides to omit some of the witnesses 
from his case. 
5. Offences of a continuing nature 
An alibi situation difficult to include within the definition in 
s. 367A(8) arose in R. v. Hassan. 81 
The accused Hassan had b e en convicted on a count which alleged that 
on July 29, 1968 and o t h er days b e twee n that date and August 21, 
1968 , in the City of Ca rd iff he lived on the earnings of a 
prostitute. On August 20, 1968 the police raided the prostitutes 
fla t and claimed the y saw Hassan leaving through the window. At 
the trial Hassan sought to call and give evidence that he was 
elsewhere on August 20, but the judge refused to admit this evidence 
because no notice of it had been given under s.367A. 
82 The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the accused, holding 
that the evidence sought to be admitted was not "evidence in support 
of an alibi" within the me a ning of s.367A(8) = 
"What does appear to this Court to be a conclusive point is 
that the statutory definition of the phrase 'evidence in 
support of an alibi' does appear to envisage an offence which 
ne cessarily invo lve s the accused being at a particular place 
at a particular time." 83 
81 [1970]1 Q.B. 423. 
82 Edmund Davies and Fenton Atkinson L.JJ., Shaw J. 
83 Ibid., at page 428. 
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In other words, the Court of Appeal took the view that this was not 
an alibi because even if the evidence were true, he might still be 
guilty of the charge. This evidence was merely part of the defence 
case, not an alibi. 
But it seems s.367A(l) will still have to be complied with where 
the "alibi" evidence covers the whole of the period when the crime 
was alleged to have been conunitted: 
"There may be difficulties regarding the giving of notice 
of alibi in relation to offences of a continuing nature. 
Nevertheless there~ argurnents for holding that the mischief 
sought to be cured by the statutory provision might well 
exist in relation to such offences." 84 
Thus Hassan would presumably have been alleging an alibi within 
the meaning of s.367A(8) if he had tendered evidence that he was in 
Paris throughout the whole period betwemJuly 29, 1968 and August 
21, 1968. 85 
6. Negative Evidence: not covered by s.367A(8)? 
If the accused at trial simply states "I wasn't there" and adduces 
evidence to support that claim, does such evidence come within the 
meaning of "evidence in support of an alibi"? On a strict 
interpretation of the language of s.367A(8) the answer is no: 
R. v. Gibbs. 86 Gibbs was charged with taking and driving away 
a motor car. The prosecution adduced evidence that he was the 
driver of the car when it was stopped by the police. Yet at the trial 
Gibbs wished to put forward two witnesses who claimed they were the 
only persons present in the car when it was stopped by the police, 
although he had not complied with s.367A(2) (a). Goodall J. held that 
since this evidence was not within the meaning of "evidence in 
84 Ibid, at page 428, per Edmund Davies L.J. He gave as an 
example an alleged nuisance. 
85 As suggested by a legal commentator - ss[1970JCrim. L.R. 153. 
86 [1974] Crim. L.R. 474. 
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support of an alibi", it was thus not subject to the requirements of 
s. 367A(l). The witnesses, therefore, were entitled to be heard. 
Goodall J. was drawn inextricably to this conclusion by the 
language of s.367A( 8 ). To be "evidence in support of an alibi", 
it must be "evidence tending to show that, by reason of the presence 
of the accused at a particular place or in a particular area at a 
particular time he was not ... ". 87 R. v. Gibbs, it is submitted, 
points to a potenti a lly important drafting inadequacy of s.367A(8) -
clearly the accused was alleging an alibi. There had not been such 
investigations prior to trial in this case as there were in "the 
Banham murder trial"; yet the unsworn statement made in this case 
might well have produced the same effect as an alibi, even though 
not referring to Gibb s 's own whereabouts. To allow an accused to 
"spring" evidence to the effect that "I wasn't there" upon the 
Court would be contrary to the intent of s.367A, since such evidence, 
it is argued, amounts to an alibi. This anomaly can only be remedied 
by an appropriate amendment to s.367A(8). A sugge sted amendment 
might read: 
"(8) In this section, the expression 'evidence in support 
of an alibi' means evidence tending to show that the accused 
was not, or was unlikely to have been, at the place where 
the offence is alleged to have been corrunitted at the time 
of its alleged corrunission, whether by reason of his presence 
at a particular place or in a particular area at a particular 
time, or otherwise." 
7. 14 days grace? 
The ·average period between corruni ttal proceedings and trial date is 
three weeks. Normally, therefore, the statutory period for the 
giving of notice of alibi will have elapsed. But it is not unlikely 
that an accused's tri a l will come up within fourteen days after 
87 Emphasis supplied. 
l:llrRAR 
-30-
committal proceedings. Whereas formerly an accused in that position 
would only "spring" an alibi on the Court at the risk of adverse 
comment, it is now at least arguable that until the fourteen days 
have expired, an accused can spring alibis with impunity for the 
reason that he ought not to be criticised for not having given notice 
h . d b h 1 . l . 88 h · sooner tan require y t e egis ation. Clearly t is argument 
is likewise contrary to the spirit of s.367A, and it is hoped that 
judges will exercise their general powers already referred to 
accordingly. To ensure certainty however, statutory modification 
is desirable. A possibility might be: 
"367A(l) On the trial of an accused person who has been 
committed for trial, he shall not without the leave of the 
Court adduce evidence in support of an alibi unless, 
before the date of his trial or before the expiry of 14 days 
after the date on which he is so committed, whichever is 
is the earlier, he has given notice of particulars of the 
alibi• II 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
It would be Utopian legislation that claimed to be above fault or 
even criticism. s.367A is above neither, and this paper has attempted 
to set them out. Nevertheless the effect of the section has been to 
withdraw from the criminal trial an unwarranted advantage to the 
accused. s.367A, it is submitted, provides a laudable innovation to 
our criminal law. 
After all, it is not merely the accused who has an interest in seeing 
that the trial is conducted fairly. Society also has a vested 
interest. The fairest trial must be one that is conducted on the 
sound basis of the true facts. The purpose of the "sprung alibi" 
however, was often to conceal the true facts by preventing any 
attempted disclosure of them by the prosecution. This only served 
88 c.f. R. v. Lewis op. cit., n.61. 
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to weigh the odds unjustifiably in favour of the accused: 
"The criminal trial should be a fairly conducted inquiry into the 
truth, not a forensic game." 89 
consistent with this proposition. 
s.367A can be nothing but 
There are in any case adequate safeguards provided by s.367A(l} to 
protect the all-important interests of the accused. It is difficult 
to conceive an alternative argument against destruction of the 
"sprung alibi", other than the argument that it would be in 
derogation of the accused's best interests. It is suggested however 
that the only "best" interests at stake would be those of the 
would-be giver of false alibis: 
"If the alibi be true, there can be no sensible objection 
to the disclosure in advance of the witnesses' names. If 
the alibi be false, no doubt there is a very understandable 
objection from the accused's point of view, but hardly 
from the public point of view." 90 
8 9 Ante t n. 19 . 
90 Ante, n.28. 

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
L 
Folder 
Co 
C OK, G. II~ 
S .367A: 11Sprune a li-
bis" seized from tie-
fence weaponry. 
335,979 
LAW LIIS RARY 
A foie of 1 Oc per day is 
charged on overdue books 
L .r' 
L 
Folder 
Co 
Due 
COOK, G. N. 
J . 3(,?A : "Sprung ali -
bis" seized from de-
fence weaponry. 
333 , 979 
Borrower's Nome 
• 

